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After the St. Francis Dam: how California changed dam safety
The 205-foot dam failed at midnight on March 12, 1928. How the disaster ended the municipal exemption from state oversight and shaped California dam law.
It was two and a half minutes before midnight on March 12, 1928, and in San Francisquito Canyon, north of what is now Santa Clarita, the dark was about to be broken by water. A concrete dam gave way. The reservoir behind it, filled to capacity for the first time less than a week earlier, ran down the canyon and into the Santa Clara River valley, and kept running. It reached the Pacific Ocean near Ventura hours later, having wrecked ranches, farms, a power station and the small communities in its path. More than four hundred people died. It remains one of the deadliest civil engineering failures in American history, and the dam belonged to the City of Los Angeles.
The failure has been told many times, and its earlier chapters are covered in The St. Francis Dam failure of March 12, 1928. This account starts afterward: what the investigators concluded, what the state of California did about it and why a law passed in the summer of 1929 still shapes how dams in the state are inspected today.
What failed, in brief
The St. Francis Dam was built by the city's water bureau as part of the Los Angeles Aqueduct system, which carried water from the Owens Valley across the desert to the city; the larger story of that system is in The Los Angeles Aqueduct of 1913: how a city reached for distant water and Owens Valley and the water wars: the case against and for the aqueduct. It was a curved concrete structure about 205 feet high, built between 1924 and 1926 to store water in a canyon near the end of the aqueduct, as a reserve for the city and to regulate the flow through the system. The city's own engineers oversaw its design and construction, led by the water bureau's chief engineer, William Mulholland, who had directed the building of the aqueduct itself.
The reservoir filled in early March 1928. In the final days, observers noticed leaks and muddy water at the base. The chief engineer inspected the dam on the day of the failure and judged it safe. A few hours later, it failed.
The surge went down San Francisquito Canyon, past a power plant and workers' housing, into the Santa Clara River valley, and through what are now Castaic, Santa Paula, Fillmore and Piru, toward the sea near Ventura County's coast. Estimates of the dead vary, with published figures ranging from over 420 to more than 450, partly because some bodies were never found and some victims were migrant workers whose names were not recorded. The communities of the region took years to rebuild.
The investigations
Within days, several inquiries began. The Los Angeles County coroner held an inquest, a state commission of experts examined the site, and a number of independent engineers and geologists offered opinions of their own. The conclusions were not identical, but they converged on one central finding: the dam had been built on a foundation that could not support it. The rock on the two sides of the canyon was weak and, in places, unstable. An ancient landslide lay on one side, and on the other the rock was a conglomerate that softened and crumbled when saturated. As the reservoir rose and water soaked into the foundation, the abutments gave way.
The inquest placed responsibility on the city's water bureau, and the chief engineer took public responsibility for the failure. His acceptance of blame, in testimony reported at the time, ended his career in public service and the standing of a man who had been among the most celebrated engineers in the state. The deeper issue was institutional. The city had designed, built, approved and operated the dam with no independent review. Its engineers were the only experts to look at the site, and no outside authority had the power to tell them to stop.
The gap in the law
California had a dam safety law when the dam failed, but it was weak. A 1915 statute required owners of dams to submit plans to the State Engineer, but it carried no real penalty for failing to comply and left the engineer with little authority to enforce it. More to the point, the law did not apply equally to everyone. Municipal water agencies, among them the Los Angeles water bureau and the water district of the East Bay, were exempt from state oversight of their dams.
The exemption rested on a belief that cities had their own engineering departments, with expertise and public accountability, and did not need a state review. St. Francis undercut that belief. A municipal engineering department with a distinguished reputation had built a dam that failed catastrophically, and nobody outside the department had examined the plans.
The 1929 law
The Legislature acted within a year. On August 14, 1929, California enacted new dam safety legislation that gave the State Engineer the authority to review and approve the plans for most non-federal dams above a certain size, to inspect them during construction and afterward, and to order repairs or limits on the water behind them. The thresholds applied to dams more than 25 feet high or impounding more than 50 acre-feet of water, according to the published history of the program. Crucially, the new law removed the exemption for municipal engineering departments. A city's dam would now face the same review as a private one.
The same year, California took another step in the same spirit. The state created a Board of Registration for Civil Engineers, which licensed engineers and set a standard for who could use the title. The two reforms carried one lesson of the disaster: engineering decisions with public consequences should not rest on a single organization's confidence in itself.
Today the state's dam safety program is run by the Division of Safety of Dams, part of the state Department of Water Resources. The division reviews designs for dams, inspects them regularly, requires owners to submit analyses of how their dams would perform in earthquakes and floods and has the authority to restrict reservoirs that do not meet the standards. The program traces directly to the 1929 law, and the department's own history of dam safety begins with the St. Francis failure. The department's website describes the program and lists the dams under its jurisdiction.
The next test: 1963 and 1971
The program has been tested and revised since. Two later events in Los Angeles bear on it most.
In December 1963 the Baldwin Hills Reservoir, an earthen reservoir in the hills of the city's west side, failed, sending a wall of water down into the neighborhood below. The failure killed five people and destroyed dozens of homes. It was blamed on subsidence and faults in the underlying ground, and it showed that even a dam inspected under the state system could fail if the ground beneath it was unstable. The reservoir was not rebuilt.
On February 9, 1971, the San Fernando earthquake, a magnitude 6.6 quake, struck the northern San Fernando Valley, and the shaking badly damaged the Lower Van Norman Dam, an earthen dam in Sylmar holding a large reservoir above a densely populated area. The dam did not fail, but part of its upstream slope slid into the water, leaving only a few feet of earth between the reservoir and the lip of the dam. Tens of thousands of residents downstream were evacuated while the reservoir was drawn down. The near-miss led to a major reexamination of earthen dam design and of how dams respond to earthquakes, and the state's program was strengthened. The quake's wider consequences are in The February 9, 1971 Sylmar earthquake and what it taught the city, and Sylmar, where the dam stands, lay near the epicenter.
It is a familiar pattern in civil engineering. A failure reveals a gap, a rule closes it and the next failure shows what the rule missed. California's program has been revised repeatedly since 1929, including after those later events.
The memorial
For many years the St. Francis disaster was not well remembered, even in the communities it devastated. The city made little effort to commemorate it, and the ruins in the canyon were left largely as they were. In recent decades local historians, descendants and communities in the Santa Clarita Valley and Ventura County have worked to keep the memory alive. In 2019 Congress created a national memorial for the disaster, administered by the U.S. Forest Service, on federal land in the canyon, and the site is now a place where visitors can learn what happened. Access and visiting conditions change, so check with the Forest Service before going.
What it means for Los Angeles today
For a city whose history is bound up with water, St. Francis is one chapter of a larger account. The Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, the successor to the old water bureau, operates reservoirs, dams and an extensive system of pipelines, and it is now subject to the state's oversight like any other dam owner. The department's role today is described in Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, and the supply system in Where Los Angeles gets its water: the aqueduct and LADWP today.
For residents the topic has a practical side as well. Many people live below dams without knowing it. The state requires owners of high-hazard dams to prepare inundation maps and emergency action plans that show where water would go if a dam failed, and these are shared with local emergency agencies. The city's Emergency Management Department coordinates preparedness and alerts, and it is worth signing up for NotifyLA, as described in NotifyLA and Alert LA County: signing up for emergency alerts, so that an evacuation order or warning reaches you. The general principles of household readiness are in Emergency preparedness for Los Angeles households, and the earthquake side of it in northridge's lessons for the next big earthquake.
The lesson
The central lesson of the St. Francis Dam is not that engineers fail. It is that no organization should be the only judge of its own work. The 1929 law states that principle: when the consequences of a failure fall on thousands of people downstream, an independent review of the design is part of the cost of building. California's program has not prevented every problem, but it has changed how the state watches its dams, and the law that created it began in a canyon near midnight on a March night in 1928.