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The St. Francis Dam failure of March 12, 1928
At 11:57 p.m. on March 12, 1928, a Los Angeles dam in San Francisquito Canyon failed. What happened, how many died and the dam safety program that followed.
Two and a half minutes before midnight on March 12, 1928, a wall of water began pouring out of San Francisquito Canyon, north of what is now Santa Clarita. The St. Francis Dam, a concrete structure the City of Los Angeles had built to store water for its growing population, had failed. Within about an hour the reservoir behind it was empty, and a flood wave was racing down the Santa Clara River valley toward the Pacific. By the time it was over, hundreds of people were dead, and one of the most celebrated engineers in the United States had seen his career end.
By many accounts the St. Francis disaster is the second-deadliest event in California's history, after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake, and it is remembered as one of the worst civil engineering failures in American history. It is also one of the less familiar stories in a city that has built much of its identity on water engineering. Here is what happened, what investigators concluded and what changed afterward.
Why the dam existed
The dam was part of the Los Angeles Aqueduct system, the 215-mile conduit the city completed in 1913 to bring water from the Owens Valley. The aqueduct delivered water by gravity, and the system needed storage to balance supply and demand and to hold water in reserve for dry periods. The city's Bureau of Water Works and Supply, the predecessor of today's Department of Water and Power, built the St. Francis Dam in the mid-1920s in San Francisquito Canyon, along the aqueduct's path through the mountains north of the city. The background to that system, including the conflict it produced in the Owens Valley, is in Owens Valley and the water wars: the case against and for the aqueduct and The Los Angeles Aqueduct of 1913: how a city reached for distant water.
The dam's designer and the head of the department was William Mulholland, who had overseen the aqueduct itself and was widely respected as the engineer who had made modern Los Angeles possible. That prestige is part of the story. The dam was built under the city's own authority, designed by its own department and approved by its own chief, with no independent review of the kind that later became standard.
The night of the failure
Water in the reservoir had been rising toward the full level in the weeks before the failure. On the day of March 12 there were reports of leaks. Mulholland and an assistant visited the dam that day, inspected it and concluded that it was safe. The dam failed a few hours later, in the last minutes before midnight.
When it went, the reservoir poured out through the canyon. Accounts describe the reservoir emptying in roughly an hour, sending a surge of water, mud and debris through the canyon and down the valley of the Santa Clara River. The flood followed the river for dozens of miles, through small farming communities and settlements, and reached the coast in Ventura County in the early morning hours.
The water destroyed bridges, railroad lines, farms, orchards, houses and camps along the way. People in the valley's small towns were asleep when it came. Those downstream had little or no warning, because the failure came at night in a region with few telephones and no alert systems of the kind residents have today, such as those described in NotifyLA and Alert LA County: signing up for emergency alerts. Some residents were warned by telephone operators, motorists and others who raced down the valley, and those warnings saved lives, though many people were beyond reach.
The toll
The number of dead is still uncertain. The official count reached 385 by August 1928, and bodies continued to be found in the years afterward. More recent tallies put the toll at no fewer than 431, other sources give about 450, and some estimates run higher because many victims, including transient workers and farm laborers, were never identified or counted. The disagreement over the number is itself a sign of how chaotic the aftermath was, in a region where records of workers and migrants were thin.
The devastation was concentrated in the communities along the river, including areas of what is now Santa Clarita and the farm towns of Ventura County. Property damage was extensive, and many families lost homes, livestock and crops as well as relatives. A disaster of this size demanded rescue, burial and relief on a scale the region had not seen, and communities that had lost their neighbors had to rebuild with few resources.
Why it failed
In the days after the disaster, investigators from the state, the county and other bodies went looking for the cause. The inquiries heard testimony from engineers, geologists and witnesses. A coroner's inquest examined the deaths, and a commission appointed by the governor reviewed the dam. Mulholland testified and took responsibility, famously saying that if there was a fault, he alone was to blame.
The principal conclusions pointed to the foundation. The dam sat against canyon walls and a foundation of rock that proved weaker than expected, and the failure appears to have begun on one side of the canyon. A concrete dam is only as strong as the ground that holds it, and the geology at the site was unstable in ways the designers had not understood. Later analyses by geologists and engineers added detail, including the role of ancient landslides and rock that weakened when saturated. The inquiries also noted the absence of independent review of the design. The city had both designed and approved its own dam, and no outside engineer was required to check it.
The commission's findings were not a criminal conviction. The coroner's jury did not charge Mulholland with a crime, and he was cleared of criminal responsibility, but he accepted blame, and the disaster effectively ended his public career. He retired not long afterward, and his reputation, which had been that of a hero, became far more complicated.
What changed
The most important legacy of the disaster is in law. The failure led California to create a state dam safety program. In the years that followed, the state established an oversight process under which the design, construction and inspection of dams of a certain size are reviewed by state engineers, with independent review of plans before a dam can be built and regular inspections afterward. California's modern dam safety system traces its roots to the lessons of St. Francis.
The disaster also changed how engineers thought about dam design and about the geology of dam sites. It encouraged a more careful approach to foundations, an emphasis on independent review and an understanding that a public agency can make mistakes even when its leaders are respected. The idea that a project should be reviewed by someone other than its builders has become a basic principle of large public works, and the city's later dams and reservoirs have been subject to state oversight.
For Los Angeles, the aftermath also had political effects. The city took responsibility for compensating victims and families. Claims were settled through the city, and the cost was large for the era. The dam was not rebuilt, and the remains of the structure still stand in the canyon, a few concrete blocks and a stump of the dam's center. Water supply for the city continued through other facilities, and the Department of Water and Power, described in Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, has run the city's system ever since. What happened afterward in the valley and in the city is told in After the St. Francis Dam: how California changed dam safety.
The state agency that grew from it
Today dam safety in California is overseen by the Division of Safety of Dams, part of the state's Department of Water Resources. The division reviews plans for new dams and for changes to existing ones, inspects dams on a regular schedule and can order restrictions on a reservoir if a dam is found unsafe. That structure, with a state engineer reviewing the work of the dam's owner, is the direct answer to the central failure at St. Francis: a dam that had been designed, approved and inspected by the same agency.
Lessons people still draw
- Independent review matters. A project's builder should not be the only judge of its safety.
- Geology is part of the design. A strong structure on weak ground is a weak structure.
- Warnings save lives. The villages downstream had no formal warning system in 1928, and modern alert systems exist because of lessons like this one.
- Reputation is not evidence. The engineer who inspected the dam that day was one of the most trusted in the country, and the inspection still missed what was coming.
Remembering it
The St. Francis Dam story has been told in books, documentaries and local exhibits, and it is a recurring subject in the history of Santa Clarita and the Ventura County towns that were hit. The anniversary of the disaster, March 12, is remembered in the communities that lost people. For visitors interested in the physical site, the canyon is in the Angeles National Forest, and public access, if available, is described by the Forest Service and local historical groups. Anyone visiting should check conditions and closures before going, because the area is remote and the terrain is rough.
The story belongs in any account of the region's history because it complicates the usual narrative of Los Angeles as a city that conquered its geography with engineering. The same department that brought water across mountains and deserts also built a dam that killed hundreds. A resident of the Los Angeles area who lives below a dam, on a floodplain or in a canyon can learn from it. Large dams in California are now inspected and regulated, and the county and city have emergency plans for dam failures. Preparedness advice, including how to find your evacuation zone and sign up for alerts, is in Know your evacuation zone: how Los Angeles warns and moves people, and the guide to earthquakes, which can also stress dams and other structures, is in Earthquake readiness in Los Angeles.
Key facts at a glance
- What: failure of the St. Francis Dam in San Francisquito Canyon.
- When: two and a half minutes before midnight on March 12, 1928.
- Who built it: the City of Los Angeles, through its water department under William Mulholland.
- Toll: estimates range from at least 431 to about 450, with some accounts higher.
- Result: investigations, a loss of public confidence in the department and the beginning of a state dam safety program.